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Abstract. Poland, when acceded to GTRI (Global Threat Reduction Initiative) in 2004, has committed to convert the nuclear fuel of the Research Reactor 
MARIA, operated by the National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ) in Świerk. The conversion means giving up of high enriched uranium fuel 
containing 36% of U-235, which was used so far, and replacing it with the low enriched uranium fuel (19.7% U-235). This article describes the potential 
usability of the Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making (IRIDM) methodology in optimization of the fuel conversion procedure. 
Keywords: nuclear safety, Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making (IRIDM), Research Reactor MARIA, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), nuclear fuel conversion 
ZASTOSOWANIE IRIDM W PROCESIE DECYZYJNYM 
DOTYCZĄCYM KONWERSJI PALIWA W REAKTORZE MARIA 
Streszczenie. Polska, przystępując w 2004 roku do programu GTRI (Inicjatywa Redukcji Zagrożeń Globalnych), zobowiązała się do konwersji paliwa 
jądrowego w reaktorze badawczym MARIA, eksploatowanym przez Narodowe Centrum Badań Jądrowych (NCBJ) w Świerku. Konwersja ta oznacza 
rezygnację z dotychczas użytkowanego paliwa, zawierającego 36% U-235 i zastąpienie go paliwem nisko wzbogaconym (19.7% U-235). Niniejszy artykuł 
opisuje potencjalne zastosowanie zintegrowanego procesu decyzyjnego (IRIDM) w optymalizacji procedury konwersji paliwa. 
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo jądrowe, zintegrowany proces decyzyjny, Reaktor Badawczy MARIA, Inicjatywa Redukcji Zagrożeń Globalnych (GTRI), konwersja paliwa 
 
Introduction 
The regulatory body responsible for nuclear issues in Poland  
is the National Atomic Energy Agency (NAEA). The mission  
of this organization is to make decisions on the nuclear facilities 
and activities within the country, including technology licensing, 
developing of the nuclear regulations and conducting technical 
inspections, in order to ensure public safety and environmental 
protection. In carrying out its responsibilities, NAEA cooperates 
with external organizations, i.e. the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
(U.S. NRC), in the field of development and implementation  
of the nuclear safety and security standards. 
In 2004 Poland has also officially acceded to Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI) established by the U.S. National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The main aim of this 
programme is to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate  
the disposition of the high risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological 
materials around the world that pose a threat to the international 
community. Otherwise these materials could potentially be used 
by terrorists to make an improvised nuclear device, a radiological 
dispersal device or a dirty bomb. One of the main GTRI goals  
is to convert research reactors and isotope production facilities 
from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched 
uranium (LEU), which cannot be used to make a nuclear weapon 
even if it falls into the wrong hands. So far under the GTRI project 
82 research reactors around the world that used HEU have 
converted to LEU fuel or been verified as shut down. It means that 
more than 3450 kilograms of HEU and plutonium – enough  
for more than 135 nuclear weapons – have been removed [14]. 
Poland, when acceded to GTRI project, has also committed  
to convert the nuclear fuel of the Research Reactor MARIA, 
operated by the National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ)  
in Świerk. The conversion means giving up of MR-6 – Russian 
HEU fuel containing 36% of U-235, which was used so far,  
and replacing it with CERCA LEU (19.7% U-235) fuel, 
manufactured in France. However, due to the significant 
differences in physical characteristics between the previously used 
and the new fuel elements, the conversion is a very complex 
process. Change of the uranium enrichment as well  
as modification of the fuel element design leads to changes  
of physical parameters of the reactor core. Therefore, when  
the decision on the fuel conversion has been made, one needs  
to answer question how to perform this process in an optimal 
manner. Basic criterion is to maintain the previous operating 
parameters of the reactor while meeting the safety requirements 
after the conversion. 
However, economic costs as well as time and specialized 
resources have to be also taken into account in the decision 
making. In such cases, when non-routine decision has to be made, 
usage of the IRIDM (Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making) 
methodology is recommended by the IAEA [13]. This article 
describes the potential application of IRIDM in optimization  
of fuel conversion process of the MARIA reactor. 
1. The Research Reactor MARIA 
The Research Reactor MARIA is a multi-purpose, high flux, 
pool type reactor, moderated with water and beryllium with 
graphite reflector and pressurized channels consisting of 22 
concentric six-tube assemblies of fuel elements. The active length 
of the fuel assemblies is 1000 mm. The reactor was designed with 
a high degree of application flexibility and it has been using  
the high enriched uranium fuel (UO2-Al alloy) with aluminium 
cladding since it began the operation. The fuel channels  
are situated in a matrix containing beryllium blocks and enclosed 
in a lateral reflector made of graphite blocks in aluminium cans. 
MARIA is equipped with vertical channels for irradiation of target 
materials, a rabbit system for short irradiations and 7 horizontal 
neutron beam channels. The nominal power of reactor is 30 MWt 
while the thermal neutron flux density is 4.0∙1014 neutrons/cm2s. 
The Research Reactor MARIA went critical for the first time 
in December 1974 and remained in operation until 1985 when  
it was shut down for modernization, that encompassed upgrading 
and refurbishment of the technological systems. In particular, 
efficiency of the ventilation and cooling system was improved.  
In 1993 the reactor has been put into operation again [6]. 
Currently the main area of its application is the radioisotopes 
production. It should be highlighted here that MARIA is one  
of the few reactors able to produce Mo-99 on a global scale. 
Providing a regular supply of molybdenum is essential for the 
diagnosis of cancer in medical centres all over the world [5]. This 
reactor is also suitable for testing of fuel and materials for the 
nuclear power engineering, neutron studies (radiography, 
activation analysis and transmutation doping) and for the scientific 
research in the field of condensed matter physics. 
Moreover, implementation of a new experimental medical 
installation inside of the reactor is being considered,  
i.e. the Boron-Neutron Capture Therapy (BNCT) which  
is an experimental radiotherapy technique used to treat the most 
aggressive types of brain tumours that cannot be surgically 
removed from the human body. To date, clinical trials of that 
therapy have been initiated at only a handful of research reactors 
around the world [4, 11]. 
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2. The fuel conversion procedure 
The fuel conversion process, which leads to decrease  
of the enrichment from 36% to 19.7% of U-235, is posing  
a problem. Namely, in order to maintain approximately the same 
thermal power after the conversion, the volume of fuel itself has  
to be greater. For that reason the present fuel channel 
configuration – that bases on 6 concentric tubes (Fig. 1) – will be 
replaced with a new one, which consists of only 5 tubes but with 
different diameters and thicknesses. Moreover, some extra 
internals for stiffening of the structure will be also installed. 
 
Fig. 1. Horizontal cross section of the high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel element 
Since the new fuel elements have a different design it was 
necessary to qualify them for usage in the MARIA reactor by 
direct irradiation of two trial assemblies in the core, under normal 
operational conditions. It was preceded by calculation analyses 
and measurements. First of all the neutronic and core reactivity 
characteristics for a configuration with the trial LEU assemblies 
were compared to the core with HEU fuel. The calculations did 
not show significant differences between these two cases [8]. 
The thermal hydraulic analysis shows that the cladding 
temperature for both types of fuel elements are almost the same, 
e.g. maximum cladding temperature on the internal surface  
of the tube is 425 K and 426 K for LEU and HEU, respectively. 
However, the maximum heat flux on the external wall of the fuel 
tube is 2,61 MW/m2 and 2,04 MW/m2 for the LEU and HEU fuel, 
respectively. Moreover, the data acquired from the performed 
measurements point out that the coefficient of hydraulic resistance 
for LEU fuel elements exceeds by around 30% the resistance 
coefficient for the Russian HEU fuel [3]. 
The required coolant flow rate through the new LEU fuel 
channel is at least 30 m3/h while in the HEU fuel it is equal  
to 25 m3/h. This difference implies the necessity of increasing  
the mass flow in the new channels up to 120% of previous 
nominal flow. Since the existing infrastructure is not sufficient  
to increase the mass flow, this process requires replacement of the 
primary cooling channel pumps. It complicates the whole 
procedure and makes the full conversion impossible without 
expensive investments. However, the experiment which has been 
carried out, shows a possibility of initiating the partial conversion 
process even before modernization of the pump system [7]. Thus 
the whole procedure would proceed in a gradual way and the most 
burned-up HEU fuel would be unloaded first. 
Such a solution seems to be optimal from the utility point  
of view, but the final decision and ultimate responsibility in such 
a case lies always in the competence of the NAEA. The NAEA, 
while making decisions on nuclear installations, firstly shall  
be guided by the public safety. Thus the transparency and 
auditability of the decisions is highly expected by people. In order 
to meet this challenge it is recommended to implement IRIDM 
methodology within the regulatory organization. 
3. Framework of the IRIDM process 
According to the basic framework of IRIDM, proposed by the 
IAEA, the clear definition of issue to be resolved is crucial in 
identifying which elements or information are relevant in decision 
making. Thus, this is the first step of the IRIDM process (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. Organizational framework and key elements of the IRIDM process [cf. 9, 13] 
After defining the problem, consideration must be given to the 
requirements of both regulatory body and utility in order to draft 
a preliminary set of options that potentially could solve the issue. 
However, to make the final decision and choose one from  
the preliminary set of options, specified elements (i.e. the 
standards and good practices, operating experience, deterministic 
and probabilistic considerations, organizational and security 
systems, research and economic insights) should be accounted  
for. All these elements have been described in detail in a separate 
article of the authors [2]. 
Relative importance of each element depends upon  
the decision to be made and should be weighted either 
qualitatively or quantitatively. This process leads to evaluation 
and to reduction of the preliminary set of options. Finally, one  
of them should be chosen, implemented and monitored. If the 
performance of just implemented decision is not satisfactory 
corrective actions should be undertaken and the list of options 
needs to be redefined. 
4. Potential application of IRIDM 
Until now, the activities of the NAEA were based mainly  
on the deterministic approach and engineering judgment.  
The IRIDM methodology is not yet a mandatory formula for the 
decision making process, but its implementation is considered  
to be a valuable asset due to its well organized structure, 
consistency and an approach easy to follow step by step. 
The very first case study made with use of the IRIDM 
methods was to determine the best way of the MARIA reactor 
core conversion process. According to the IRIDM methodology,  
at the point when the issue to be resolved is known, one needs  
to define some options overcoming the problem. This means that 
either the regulatory body or the utility has to consider and outline 
the possible solutions. 
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In this case, NAEA preferences were as follows. First of all, 
the new fuel means either the change in reactor core configuration 
(i.e. structure of the fuel channels) or in cooling circuit (i.e. higher 
efficiency of the feed-water pumps). This can be qualified  
as a major change and thus it requires additional analyses that will 
prove the safety margins. The results together with technical data 
should be then submitted to the President of NAEA in a form  
of annex to the Safety Analysis Report of the reactor. 
Additionally, the document should contain an impact study of the 
LEU fuel introduction on reactor operation (i.e. insufficient 
coolant flow, neutronic balance aspects etc.) during the conversion 
period. One should remember that the gradual way of core 
conversion means handling two types of fuel at the same time.  
It requires more complex safety analyses but on the other hand  
it gives a chance to avoid radical change of the core matrix that 
could lead either to technical or economical maintenance 
difficulties. 
Beyond safety aspects, from the utility point of view, it is 
highly important to maintain production of the isotopes. For 
certain types of them it is necessary to maintain proper neutron 
flux in the core, which requires operation with high power of 
reactor. Finally, in order to deal with the issue, NAEA has defined 
three options to be considered (Tab. 1). The only difference 
between them is the time when the conversion may begin. Each 
option assumes the need for making the safety analysis for reactor 
operating either with new LEU fuel or with new pumps, but for 
option 1 and 2 it is necessary to make additional analyses in case 
of old pumps, i.e. under condition of insufficient amount  
of coolant provided to the new LEU fuel channels. 
Table 1. Preliminary set of options prepared by the National Atomic Energy Agency 
Option number (i) Option description 
1 
Permission may be granted for partial core conversion before 
change of the pumps (with higher flow rate) without any 
additional criteria 
2 
Permission may be granted for partial core conversion before 
change of the pumps (with higher flow rate) but with additional 
criteria 
3 
Rejection of partial core conversion before change of the 
pumps 
The above considerations should now be thoroughly checked, 
by the dedicated multidisciplinary IRIDM team. The team 
members were recruited from two divisions of the Nuclear Safety 
Department (at NAEA), each of them with a suitable knowledge 
of the facility. It should be stressed out that designated NAEA 
experts have an experience with the core conversion. The first 
successful core conversion of the MARIA reactor was conducted 
in 2002. At that time the enrichment of the HEU fuel was 
decreased from 80% to 36% of U-235. This process revealed also 
some aspects, which were not accounted for, but should be put on 
higher attention later on. Due to limited computational capabilities 
of NAEA certain analyses were also performed by the NCBJ 
experts [1, 10]. 
Information from two official IAEA documents (INSAG-25 
and TECDOC-1436), describing the principles of risk informed 
regulations of nuclear facilities as well as the basic framework for 
IRIDM, were used as a basis for this study [12, 13]. 
Finally, all these experiences and information were used  
in further stage of IRIDM, by means of preparation of inputs  
for decision making process and assignation the input weights. 
The inputs were set into the following categories: deterministic 
aspects, probabilistic aspects, mandatory requirements, cost and 
benefits, organizational influence and doses for workers. Then the 
importance weights have been assigned to each input category 
(Tab. 2). The weights were ranging from 0 – negligible impact  
to 10 – the highest impact on decision. 
The highest weight (10) was given to deterministic aspects. 
This choice comes from the fact that during the operation  
of reactor, it is necessary to maintain safety limits and 
requirements of defence in depth methodology. 
Since the LEU fuel will be used here simultaneously with 
HEU fuel and their relative proportion will change in time during 
whole conversion period, there is a need for analysis of facility 
behaviour under such condition. This analysis should cover all 
possible accident scenarios. 
Probabilistic aspects should stay in conjunction with the 
deterministic results. Besides, since this transient period implies 
a rise of the core damage frequency, the probabilistic aspects 
should be assigned at least medium weight (8). 
Another thing is the mandatory requirements, i.e. all of the 
conversion-related analyses and in turn all changes performed  
in the core structure should strictly follow national and 
international law and regulations. Due to the fact that they can 
limit some of the actions, their impact should be considered  
in general at a medium level. However, taking into account that 
the reactor facility is operated by experienced staff, which follows 
high standards, it is unlikely to exceed safety limits.  
For that reason, the low rank (3) was set to mandatory 
requirements in this study. 
Other issues like economic cost and benefits are still quite 
relevant, because operation of the reactor is highly related  
to production of radioisotopes for the international market. Thus 
the medium impact (5) to this IRIDM study was applied. 
Reactor core conversion requires also special organizational 
effort, changes in safety management and competences, leadership 
or communication pathways between co-workers. This, in turn, 
means medium impact (5) on final decision. 
Since it is highly unlikely to exceed accounted safety limits, 
radiation doses for workers are of negligible level. That is why 
their effects are omitted in this study. 
Table 2. Weights of the input categories taken into account in the IRIDM process 
Category No. (j) Inputs description Weight (wj) 
1 Deterministic aspects – safety margins 10 
2 Probabilistic aspects – risk changes 8 
3 Other – economic costs and benefits 5 
4 Other – organizational impact 5 
5 Mandatory requirements 3 
Next step is to determine an impact of implementation of the 
various IRIDM options on each particular input. Usually, at the 
beginning of this process qualitative impact assessment  
is performed. It means that each option i needs to be analyzed  
in the context whether it has an overall positive or negative impact 
on each particular input j. After that the score can be assigned  
for each option in the range of values from -10 (the highest 
negative impact) through 0 (no impact) up to 10 (the highest 
positive impact). It allows evaluating of option i by the total 





where wj is the weighting factor of the input j and sij is the impact 
of option i on the input j [2]. Consequently, the preliminary set  
of options has been ranked by the Si factor (Tab. 3). 
Table 3. Ranking of the preliminary set of options 
Inputs 













Deterministic -6 -60 -2 -20 0 0 
Probabilistic -3 -24 -1 -8 0 0 
Economic 0 0 -2 -10 -10 -50 
Organizational 0 0 -2 -10 -10 -50 
Requirements 0 0 -3 -9 0 0 
Total (Si) --- -84 --- -57 --- -100 
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Option 1 (full conversion without changes in cooling system) 
is the best solution from the economic point of view.  
The radioisotopes can be produced continuously and no additional 
changes in the organizational system are needed. However, this 
option has an overall negative impact on both DSA and PSA 
results, -6 and -3 respectively. This is because the primary cooling 
channel pumps are not efficient enough to provide appropriate 
mass flow after conversion. Consequently, the safety margins 
cannot be maintained, which also increases the probability of an 
undesired event. Therefore, this option was rejected due to the 
highest negative impact on the safety aspects. 
Option 3 is the best solution in terms of safety. Replacement 
of the pumps ensures the same operational parameters like these 
before the core conversion. Thus the results of DSA and PSA 
would not be changed in this case. However, this option assumes 
a long-term shutdown of the reactor for the time of pump 
replacement. This generates, however, significant economic losses 
associated with interruption of the isotopes production during 
shutdown. Additionally, it needs some changes in the 
organizational system at the time of that process. These are the 
main reasons why option 3 was rejected as well. 
Finally, option 2 has been chosen even though there  
is a slightly negative impact on both safety and economic aspects. 
Moreover, the additional requirements meaning criteria on power 
limits have been proposed by the NAEA, which implies necessity 
of some organizational changes. Due to the power limits a slightly 
lower production of isotopes is expected. However, the economic 
losses are not as high as in option 3. Thus the option 2 is much 
safer than the first one and still very economically attractive. This 
is also the most balanced solution in the terms of risk distribution 
between different IRIDM inputs. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study each IRIDM option has an overall negative 
impact on the IRIDM inputs. Thus the lowest one, corresponding 
to the second option, was chosen. However, one has to remember 
that the decision on core conversion has been made in order to 
increase the security level, which balances the negative impact  
on the considered inputs. Thus, the selected option is the most 
satisfactory one. It assumes that the permission may be granted  
for partial core conversion before change of the pumps, but with 
some additional criteria, i.e. to set lower limits on power generated 
in fuel elements, where it cannot be provided nominal flow.  
That conclusion stays in compliance with results of the traditional 
decision making process, meaning the deterministic approach with 
engineering judgment. It may be also useful for further NAEA 
considerations, despite that the application of IRIDM is not yet 
obligatory in Poland. 
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